

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Employee Control over Personal Data and Acceptance of Workforce Analytics: A Systematic Review of Privacy, Transparency and Organisational Trust

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Abstract

Background: Workforce analytics, electronic performance monitoring and algorithmic management increasingly transform employee data into managerial information. Their technical capabilities have advanced faster than evidence on the conditions under which employees regard such systems as legitimate. This systematic review synthesised empirical research on how employee control over personal data, monitoring intrusiveness, transparency, procedural fairness and organisational trust shape acceptance of workforce analytics and related surveillance technologies.

Methods: Structured searches were conducted to 29 July 2026 across PubMed-indexed records and publisher-hosted databases and indexes, supplemented by backward citation chaining from major reviews. Eligible studies were peer-reviewed empirical investigations involving employees or workers exposed to electronic monitoring, people analytics, workforce tracking or algorithmic management and reporting at least one outcome concerning privacy, control, transparency, fairness, trust or acceptance. Eighteen studies were included and appraised using design-appropriate Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool principles.

Results: Across laboratory experiments, factorial-vignette studies, field surveys and mixed-method designs, three findings were consistent. First, invasiveness and collection of data beyond task-relevant purposes were associated with stronger privacy concerns and lower acceptance. Second, meaningful control-participation in monitoring design, access to collected data, relevance restrictions and opportunities for voice-was more reliably associated with legitimacy than disclosure alone. Third, privacy invasion and perceived unfairness frequently operated through organisational trust, with lower trust linked to stress, resistance, lower job attractiveness and turnover intentions. Transparency had conditional effects: it supported fairness or psychological contracts when surveillance scope was limited, but could be ineffective when extensive monitoring itself was viewed as unacceptable.

Conclusions: Employee acceptance of workforce analytics is best understood as a relational governance problem rather than a simple technology-adoption problem. Systems are more likely to be accepted when organisations minimise data scope, make purposes specific, provide employee access and voice, constrain secondary uses, and retain accountable human oversight. These findings support scenario-based experimental work that manipulates employee data control and transparency while treating organisational trust as a central mediating mechanism.

Keywords: workforce analytics; people analytics; employee monitoring; privacy; transparency; organisational trust; employee control; algorithmic management

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1. Introduction

Organisations increasingly use workforce analytics to transform digital traces of work into indicators of performance, collaboration, risk, productivity and future potential. The underlying technologies range from relatively familiar time and attendance systems to keystroke capture, screen recording, communication analysis, wearable sensors, predictive attrition models and algorithmic allocation of tasks. Although these tools are frequently introduced under the language of efficiency and evidence-based management, they also change the informational balance between employers and employees. The employer can often observe, infer and retain far more information about the worker than the worker can observe about how that information is interpreted or reused. This asymmetry makes privacy, control and trust central to the legitimacy of contemporary workforce analytics [2-4].

Electronic performance monitoring (EPM) research provides the longest empirical foundation for understanding these tensions. Early studies showed that monitoring can alter stress, perceived control and performance rather than simply increase productivity [5-8]. Later work shifted attention from the existence of monitoring to its design. In particular, task relevance, participation, monitoring type and perceived fairness influence whether employees regard data collection as procedurally legitimate [9-13]. This distinction is

important because two technically similar systems can produce different reactions depending on whether employees understand the purpose, can access or challenge the resulting data, and perceive the monitoring as proportionate to the job requirement.

The growth of people analytics and algorithmic management has expanded the problem. Workforce data may now be combined across systems, used to generate predictions and translated into automated or semi-automated recommendations. Reviews of people analytics have highlighted opacity, datafication, bias, privacy risks and the potential displacement of human judgement [14-17]. Algorithmic management research similarly shows that employees interpret automated control not only as a technical process but as an organisational signal about whether they are trusted, whether decision rules are fair, and whether they retain meaningful autonomy [18,19]. Thus, acceptance cannot be reduced to perceived usefulness in the conventional technology-adoption sense; it is embedded in the social exchange between employee and employer.

Three theoretical perspectives help explain why employee control over personal data should matter. Communication privacy management theory proposes that individuals establish boundaries around personal information and react negatively when information is collected or transferred outside expected rules [20]. Organisational justice theory suggests that voice, consistency,

relevance and adequate explanations shape procedural and informational fairness [21,22]. Social exchange and organisational trust perspectives predict that intrusive or unilateral monitoring may signal distrust, weakening the employee's willingness to reciprocate with commitment and cooperation [23,24]. Privacy-calculus models add that employees weigh expected benefits against informational risks, but recent people-analytics evidence indicates that risk perceptions can outweigh perceived usefulness when organisational trust is threatened [25].

Transparency is often presented as the obvious remedy, yet the empirical literature is more complicated. Explaining what data are collected, who can access them and how decisions are made can reduce uncertainty and support fairness. However, disclosure can also reveal the true breadth of surveillance and therefore intensify privacy concerns. Recent studies of algorithmic management and workplace surveillance show that transparency may have small, selective or context-dependent benefits rather than a uniformly positive effect [26,27]. This creates a practical and theoretical distinction between transparency as disclosure and employee control as a governance mechanism. Employees may know that monitoring occurs while still lacking any meaningful ability to influence its scope, correct data, restrict secondary use or contest conclusions.

The present review therefore addressed a focused question: among workers exposed to workforce analytics, electronic monitoring or algorithmic management, how do employee control over personal data, privacy/intrusiveness, transparency and organisational trust influence acceptance and related work outcomes? The review had three objectives: (1) synthesise empirical evidence on the effects of monitoring design and employee informational control; (2) evaluate the roles of transparency, fairness and trust as mechanisms or moderators; and (3) derive an evidence-based conceptual model suitable for a scenario-based experiment on employee acceptance of workforce analytics.

2. Methods

2.1 Design and reporting

The review was conducted as a systematic qualitative synthesis and reported using the logic of PRISMA 2020 [1]. Because the literature spans work psychology, human resource management, information systems, communication and organisational studies, a deliberately interdisciplinary search was used. The protocol specified the population, exposure, outcomes and eligible designs before synthesis. No meta-analysis was planned because monitoring technologies, experimental manipulations and outcome measures were too heterogeneous to justify a pooled effect estimate.

2.2 Search strategy

Searches were completed on 29 July 2026. Structured combinations of the following terms were used: “electronic performance monitoring”, “employee monitoring”, “workplace surveillance”, “workforce analytics”, “people analytics”, “algorithmic management”, together with “privacy”, “control”, “participation”, “transparency”, “fairness”, “justice”, “trust”, “acceptance”, “autonomy”, “reactance” and “turnover”. Search retrieval covered PubMed-indexed records and publisher-hosted databases/indexes including APA-linked records, Elsevier/ScienceDirect, Wiley, Sage, Springer, Oxford Academic, Taylor & Francis and Emerald. Backward citation chaining was performed from major reviews of EPM, workplace surveillance and people analytics [2,14,16,17]. The final search log contained 36 potentially relevant records; after removal of six overlapping/duplicate records, 30 unique records were screened (Figure 1).

Eligibility criteria

Studies were included when they (a) were peer-reviewed empirical journal articles; (b) recruited adult employees, workers, gig workers or employed respondents evaluating a realistic employment scenario; (c) examined electronic monitoring, workforce/people analytics, digital tracking or algorithmic

management; and (d) reported at least one outcome directly relevant to privacy, informational control, transparency, procedural fairness, organisational or technology trust, monitoring acceptance, job attractiveness, resistance or turnover intention. Conceptual articles and systematic reviews were retained for theoretical framing but excluded from the primary evidence table. Studies focused solely on consumer surveillance, applicant selection without an employment context, technical algorithm performance or legal doctrine were excluded.

Screening and extraction

Titles and abstracts were first screened for topical relevance, followed by full-text assessment. Five records were excluded at title/abstract stage. Twenty-five full texts were assessed and seven were excluded: three were conceptual or review articles without primary employee data, two lacked an employee/worker sample, and two did not report relevant attitudinal or relational outcomes. Eighteen studies entered the qualitative synthesis. For each, data were extracted on country/context, design, sample, form of monitoring or analytics, manipulation/exposure, focal outcomes and principal findings. The included studies are summarised in Table 2.

Quality appraisal and synthesis

Methodological quality was assessed using design-appropriate principles from the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool rather than a single numerical score. Appraisal considered clarity of the research question, suitability of sampling, validity of measures/manipulations, completeness of outcome data, control of confounding and coherence between data and interpretation. Studies were classified as having no critical limitation or some methodological concerns; none was excluded solely on quality. The synthesis used a concept-centric approach. Findings were coded under six a priori domains: monitoring invasiveness, employee control/voice, transparency, privacy, fairness, and trust/acceptance. The eligibility criteria, information sources and synthesis plan are summarised in Table 1. Relationships were then organised into a causal sequence from analytics design to employee appraisal, relational response and behavioural intention (Figure 2).

3. Results

Study selection and characteristics: Eighteen empirical studies published from 1995 to 2026 met the inclusion criteria (Figure 1; Table 2). The evidence base included laboratory experiments, scenario and factorial-vignette experiments, cross-sectional and time-lagged field surveys, and mixed-method designs. Samples ranged from controlled laboratory participants and student workers to nationally recruited employees, remote workers and gig workers. The strongest concentration of evidence came from Germany and the United States, with additional multi-country and organisational samples. Most studies examined EPM or employee monitoring software; more recent studies investigated people analytics and algorithmic management. The thematic distribution of outcomes is shown in Figure 3.

Monitoring scope and perceived invasiveness: The most consistent finding was that acceptance falls as monitoring becomes more intrusive or expands beyond data employees view as task relevant. Alge's experiment showed that limiting surveillance to job-relevant activities reduced perceived privacy invasion and improved procedural justice [9]. McNall and Roch found that monitoring modality affected both privacy and justice perceptions, with direct or less electronically intrusive forms often viewed as more interpersonally legitimate [12]. In a large German vignette experiment, Abraham and colleagues found lower acceptance when tracking targeted health or performance information, while perceived control and productive purposes improved evaluation [28]. Remote-work evidence sharpened the same pattern: screen tracking, video recording and face tracking were progressively less attractive than simple documentation of working hours [29]. Wolff and Niessen similarly found that screenshots and face-reader monitoring produced more privacy invasion and reactance than screen-time monitoring [30].

Employee control, participation and data access: Across studies, control was more than a preference for less monitoring. It included participation in design, input into implementation, access to collected information, relevance restrictions and the ability to understand how data would be used. In Alge's experiment, participation reduced privacy invasion and enhanced procedural justice even when monitoring still occurred [9]. Earlier work on personal control showed that knowing when monitoring occurred and having some influence over monitoring conditions protected task satisfaction and perceptions of autonomy [6]. The experimental evidence on tracking technologies indicates that acceptance is higher where employees perceive greater control and where analytics serve a clear work-related function [28]. More recent employee-monitoring research likewise suggests that system-level acceptance can mask strong rejection of particular features; covert, audio, webcam and continuous screen functions are evaluated especially poorly [31]. Together, these results support treating employee data control as a multidimensional governance construct rather than a binary consent variable.

Privacy and fairness as proximal mechanisms: Privacy concern was repeatedly positioned between monitoring design and downstream attitudes. In the strongest experimental evidence, job relevance and employee participation affected procedural justice partly through perceived privacy invasion [9]. Survey research likewise linked monitoring characteristics to psychological reactions that include privacy concerns, stress and reactance [11,30]. The field study by Workman showed that procedural justice moderated employee attitudes toward corporate monitoring and that better attitudes were associated with lower absenteeism [32]. These findings suggest that employees do not evaluate surveillance only by asking whether data collection is technically disclosed. They also judge whether the data are appropriate to the employment purpose, whether rules are consistent, and whether they have a legitimate opportunity for voice.

Organisational trust: Trust emerged as the most important relational mechanism connecting privacy to acceptance and retention. Kalischko and Riedl's large survey of 1,119 employees found that perceived EPM was associated with greater privacy invasion, lower organisational trust and higher stress; privacy invasion also predicted reduced trust [33]. Wolff and colleagues, using two experiments and a field study, found that leader-member exchange shaped some privacy reactions but did not fully buffer the consequences of privacy invasion for need frustration, motivation and turnover intentions [34]. In a 2026 scenario-based people-analytics study, Klöpper and Rowe found that privacy concerns eroded organisational trust strongly enough to increase intention to leave, while perceived risks outweighed usefulness [25]. Feature-level research on employee monitoring software also showed that acceptance and trust were related but not interchangeable: employees could express willingness to adopt a system yet distrust particular invasive functions [31].

Transparency: useful but conditional: Evidence did not support a simple 'more transparency is always better' proposition. In an online experiment with digital labour-platform workers, Mirbabaie and colleagues found that transparency regarding algorithmic procedures did not consistently improve informational or overall fairness; only distributive transparency produced a small improvement in distributive fairness [26]. A 2026 time-lagged study of unionised workers found that transparency protected psychological contracts and reduced turnover intentions when surveillance scope was low or moderate, but was ineffective when surveillance was extensive [27]. These results complement earlier justice research: explanations matter, but they cannot compensate for monitoring that employees regard as intrinsically excessive. Transparency therefore appears most effective when paired with proportionality and employee control rather than used as a substitute for them.

Acceptance and contextual moderators: Acceptance was shaped by purpose, location and perceived benefits as well as monitoring intensity. Wieser and Abraham found that employees working from home were more willing to tolerate monitoring when it served

feedback rather than productivity policing and when favourable job conditions offset some disadvantages, although highly invasive monitoring remained difficult to compensate [29]. Vitak and Zimmer's factorial vignette survey of 645 US remote workers similarly showed that surveillance acceptability depended on contextual privacy norms and the nature of information flows [35]. Individual attitudes also mattered: Zweig and Webster found that personality moderated acceptance even when fairness and privacy safeguards were present [13]. Social norms, however, did not reliably neutralise privacy reactions in Wolff and Niessen's experiment [30]. Thus, contextual factors can shift thresholds of acceptance, but the basic effects of invasiveness, relevance and control are robust.

Quality appraisal: Table 3 summarises methodological appraisal. Controlled and factorial-vignette studies generally offered strong internal validity and explicit manipulations but were limited by hypothetical scenarios and self-reported intentions. Field surveys improved ecological validity but were more vulnerable to common-method bias and cross-sectional inference. The most persuasive conclusions are therefore those replicated across methods: intrusive monitoring increases privacy threat; voice and relevance improve justice; trust links privacy perceptions to organizational outcomes; and transparency is conditional on the underlying legitimacy of the surveillance practice. A cross-study synthesis of the principal determinants of workforce-analytics acceptance is presented in Table 4. Now, table 3 of this manuscript shows the methodological appraisal of the included studies.

4. Discussion

This review indicates that employee acceptance of workforce analytics is not primarily a question of whether employees are technologically progressive or whether an organisation has supplied enough information about a system. Acceptance is better explained by the governance relationship surrounding employee data. Employees evaluate what is collected, whether the data are necessary for the stated purpose, who benefits, who can inspect or correct the data, and whether the organisation could use the information for purposes that were not part of the original understanding. These judgements shape privacy concern and procedural fairness, which in turn shape organisational trust and behavioural intentions.

The first major implication concerns employee control. Across experimental and survey evidence, control appears in several forms: participation before implementation, influence over monitoring conditions, access to one's own data, limitations on monitoring to task-relevant information, and the possibility of contesting interpretations. These mechanisms are conceptually distinct from consent. In employment relationships, consent may be weak because refusal can be costly. A stronger experimental manipulation would therefore present control as a bundle of concrete rights: employees can view the data collected about them, correct inaccuracies, choose among non-essential data categories, receive notice before secondary use, and request human review of analytics-based decisions. A low-control condition would retain employer-only access and broad secondary-use discretion. This would test a meaningful difference in informational power rather than a superficial difference in notice wording.

Second, the evidence supports privacy concern as an immediate appraisal mechanism. The consistency of findings across Alge [9], Abraham et al. [28], Wieser and Abraham [29], Wolff and Niessen [30], and Kalischko and Riedl [33] suggests that privacy is not an abstract ethical add-on. Employees use it as a practical signal of whether organisational boundaries have been respected. The most consequential distinction is not monitoring versus no monitoring, but proportionate versus expansive monitoring. Data types that extend into health, private spaces, continuous screenshots, audio/video or inferred emotional states create stronger concerns than clearly work-related time or task data. For a scenario-based experiment, the monitoring description should therefore specify data categories rather than simply state that 'workforce analytics' are used.

Third, organisational trust appears to be a central mediator with greater explanatory value than a simple attitude toward technology. Trust reflects an expectation that the organisation will not exploit informational advantage opportunistically. When employees perceive privacy invasion, hidden secondary uses or unfair procedures, trust declines and the consequences extend beyond acceptance of the particular system. The reviewed studies link lower trust to stress, negative attitudes, weakened psychological contracts and turnover intentions [25,27,32-34]. This supports a model in which employee control reduces privacy concern and increases procedural fairness; those appraisals strengthen organisational trust; and trust subsequently predicts acceptance of workforce analytics. Such a model is theoretically compatible with social exchange theory and organisational justice without requiring the assumption that employees make a purely economic privacy calculation.

Fourth, transparency should be manipulated with precision. Many organisational interventions use transparency as a broad label for disclosure. The evidence suggests at least three distinct forms: data transparency (what is collected), process transparency (how analytics convert data into recommendations), and consequence transparency (how outputs affect employment decisions). The 2026 algorithmic-management experiment showed that transparency effects differed by justice dimension [26], while the workplace-surveillance study showed that transparency lost protective value at high surveillance intensity [27]. Accordingly, a scenario should not treat 'transparent' as a single sentence saying that the employer explains the system. A stronger condition would specify what the employee can see: data categories, retention period, recipients, decision logic, appeal route and examples of permitted/prohibited uses.

The review also clarifies why transparency and control should be studied together. Transparency without control can make employees better informed about a situation they still cannot influence. This may increase perceived surveillance salience and, in some circumstances, reduce trust. Conversely, control without adequate information may be nominal because employees cannot exercise rights intelligently. The strongest governance configuration is therefore likely to combine substantive transparency with meaningful employee agency. A 2×2 scenario experiment-high versus low employee data control crossed with high versus low transparency-would directly test this interaction. Organisational trust can be specified as a mediator, and acceptance as the principal outcome, with privacy concern and procedural fairness as parallel or sequential mediators. The design can also measure perceived usefulness to determine whether governance effects remain after accounting for instrumental benefits.

A fifth implication concerns measurement. The included studies frequently operationalised acceptance as general attitude, willingness to adopt, job attractiveness or intention to remain, while trust was sometimes measured at the organisational level and sometimes at the technology level. For the proposed scenario-based experiment, these constructs should be separated explicitly. Acceptance should capture willingness to work under the analytics regime and willingness to permit the specified data practices; organisational trust should assess confidence that the employer will use employee data competently, benevolently and with integrity; privacy concern should assess perceived boundary violation and risk; and procedural fairness should assess voice, consistency and contestability. Keeping these measures distinct will reduce the risk of finding artificial associations caused by overlapping wording. It will also allow testing whether employees may accept a system instrumentally while still distrusting the employer or particular monitoring features, a pattern already observed in feature-level monitoring research [31].

A sixth implication is that the evidence base has moved from asking whether monitoring is good or bad toward identifying boundary conditions. Older EPM experiments established that monitoring can change stress, perceived control and behaviour [5-9], whereas newer studies show that surveillance scope, location, purpose, data access and explainability determine whether those

effects are tolerable [25-35]. This shift matters for workforce analytics because predictive systems often operate invisibly in the background and can combine data that employees originally supplied for unrelated purposes. Future studies should therefore test secondary-use restrictions and retention limits directly. For example, one scenario could state that communication metadata are used only to provide team-level workflow feedback and deleted after 30 days, while another could state that the same data are retained indefinitely and can be used in promotion or disciplinary decisions. Such manipulations would isolate governance features that are highly relevant to real analytics deployments but remain under-tested in the literature. From a practical perspective, the synthesis suggests six design principles for organisations deploying workforce analytics. Data minimisation should limit collection to information demonstrably relevant to legitimate work purposes. Purpose limitation should prevent silent movement from development or feedback uses into discipline or termination. Employees should have access to the data and meaningful correction rights. Monitoring intensity should be proportionate, especially in remote settings where work and private space overlap. Explanations should cover consequences and appeal mechanisms, not only technical functionality. Finally, analytics should support rather than displace accountable human decision-making. These practices are likely to protect trust because they change the underlying distribution of informational power rather than merely changing communications around the system.

The review has limitations. First, workforce analytics terminology is fragmented; relevant studies appear under EPM, surveillance, employee monitoring, people analytics and algorithmic management. The broad search strategy reduced but cannot eliminate the possibility of missed studies. Second, the review deliberately focused on employee perceptions and acceptance, excluding technically oriented studies and much of the hiring-algorithm literature. Third, outcome heterogeneity prevented meta-analysis. Fourth, many studies used hypothetical vignettes or cross-sectional surveys, so evidence on long-term behavioural responses remains thinner than evidence on attitudes and intentions. Finally, cultural representation remains uneven, with substantial evidence from Germany and the United States. Future field experiments should evaluate actual deployments and include countries with different privacy regulation, labour institutions and norms of managerial authority.

Despite these limitations, triangulation across designs provides a coherent answer to the review question. Employees are more likely to accept workforce analytics when they retain meaningful control over personal data, monitoring is limited to relevant purposes, procedures are fair, and the organisation remains worthy of trust. Transparency contributes to acceptance when it makes a proportionate system understandable and contestable; it is less capable of legitimising extensive surveillance. This pattern explains why employee control and organisational trust are promising focal variables for a scenario-based experiment and why privacy concern should be treated as a mechanism rather than merely a background ethical issue. The convergence of experimental, field and recent algorithmic-management evidence also suggests that future work should report the exact data categories, retention rules, decision consequences and employee rights embedded in each analytics condition. Without that detail, apparently conflicting findings may simply reflect materially different governance arrangements rather than true disagreement about employee attitudes.

5. Conclusion

Workforce analytics can support legitimate organisational objectives, but employee acceptance depends on how informational power is governed. The empirical literature consistently shows that invasive or weakly relevant monitoring heightens privacy concerns, while participation, data access, task relevance and procedural voice improve legitimacy. Organisational trust is a key relational pathway through which these design choices affect acceptance, stress and turnover intentions. Transparency is valuable when it provides actionable understanding and is paired

with proportionate surveillance and meaningful employee control; disclosure alone is not sufficient. A future scenario-based experiment should therefore manipulate substantive employee control over personal data and multi-dimensional transparency, test privacy concern and procedural fairness as proximal appraisals, and model organisational trust as a central mediator of workforce-analytics acceptance. Such a design would extend the literature from documenting employee resistance to identifying governance conditions under which analytics can be both useful and socially legitimate.

Declarations

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Figures




Figure 1. PRISMA-style flow of identification, screening, full-text assessment and study inclusion.




Figure 2. Conceptual synthesis: how workforce-analytics design may influence employee acceptance through control, privacy, fairness and Organizational trust.

Distribution of themes across included studies




Figure 3. Distribution of major themes across included studies. Studies could contribute to more than one theme.

Tables

Table 1. Eligibility criteria, information sources and synthesis plan

Element	Specification
Population	Adult employees/workers or employed respondents evaluating an employment scenario
Exposure	Electronic performance monitoring, employee monitoring software, workplace surveillance, workforce/people analytics, digital tracking or algorithmic management
Outcomes	Privacy/intrusiveness, employee control/voice, transparency, justice/fairness, organisational or technology trust, acceptance, job attractiveness, resistance, turnover intention
Designs	Peer-reviewed empirical quantitative, qualitative or mixed-method studies
Exclusions	Consumer-only surveillance; applicant-only studies without employment context; technical algorithm-performance studies; legal/conceptual papers without primary worker data
Search date	Inception to 29 July 2026
Sources	PubMed-indexed records; publisher-hosted indexed pages (Elsevier, Wiley, Sage, Springer, Oxford Academic, Taylor & Francis, Emerald); backward citation chaining
Synthesis	Concept-centric qualitative synthesis; no meta-analysis because exposures and outcomes were heterogeneous

Table 2. Characteristics and principal findings of the 18 included empirical studies

Study	Context/design	Sample	Exposure/manipulation	Outcomes	Principal finding
Aiello & Kolb, 1995 [5]	USA; laboratory experiment	Data-entry workers/participants	Individual vs group EPM	Performance, stress	Monitoring effects depended on skill/social context; non-monitored/cohesive conditions showed lower stress.
Stanton & Barnes-Farrell, 1996 [6]	USA; laboratory experiment	N=108	Control over/knowledge of monitoring	Personal control, satisfaction, performance	Greater control and knowledge about monitoring conditions improved perceived control and task reactions.
Alge, 2001 [9]	USA; experiment	Temporary workers	Task relevance and participation	Privacy invasion, procedural justice	Job relevance and employee input reduced privacy invasion and improved procedural justice.
Stanton & Weiss, 2000 [10]	USA; qualitative study	N=53 employed adults	Email/web monitoring experiences	Behaviour, privacy appraisal	Reactions depended on monitoring capability, managerial expectations and perceived use of collected data.
Zweig & Webster, 2003 [13]	North America; survey experiment	N=622	Awareness-monitoring system	Privacy, fairness, acceptance	Acceptance reflected privacy/fairness safeguards but also varied by personality.
McNall & Roch, 2007 [12]	USA; scenario experiment	N=246	Monitoring modality	Procedural/interpersonal justice, privacy	Monitoring type significantly changed fairness and privacy perceptions.
Workman, 2009 [32]	USA; field study	Employees under corporate monitoring	Security monitoring and procedural justice	Attitudes, trust, absenteeism	Trust and procedural justice moderated reactions; more favourable attitudes related to lower absence.
Jeske & Santuzzi, 2015 [11]	USA; survey	N=190 student workers	EPM technique and characteristics	Psychological reactions, acceptance	Reactions varied with what was monitored and how monitoring was implemented.
Abraham et al., 2019 [28]	Germany; factorial vignette	N=800	Tracking purpose, data type, perceived control	Acceptance	Acceptance fell for health/performance monitoring and improved with productive purpose/control.
Wieser & Abraham, 2024 [29]	Germany; factorial vignette	Employed respondents	Remote-work monitoring intensity, purpose, frequency	Job attractiveness/acceptance	More invasive home monitoring sharply reduced acceptance; feedback purpose and incentives partly mitigated effects.
Vitak & Zimmer, 2023 [35]	USA; factorial vignette	N=645 remote workers	Post-COVID workplace surveillance	Acceptability, privacy norms	Acceptability was highly contextual and sensitive to privacy/autonomy implications.
Wolff & Niessen, 2024 [30]	Germany; 3x2 scenario experiment	N=219 office workers	Screen time, screenshots, face reader; social norms	Privacy invasion, reactance	More invasive monitoring increased privacy invasion/reactance; supportive norms did not buffer effects.
Kalischko & Riedl, 2024 [33]	Austria/German-speaking;	N=1,119	Perceived EPM	Privacy, trust, stress,	EPM increased privacy invasion and stress and reduced

Study	Context/design	Sample	Exposure/manipulation	Outcomes	Principal finding
	survey			performance	rganizational trust; trust linked privacy to downstream outcomes.
Wolff et al., 2024 [34]	Germany; 2 experiments + field study	Multi-study employee samples	EPM invasiveness and LMX	Privacy, need frustration, motivation, turnover	LMX shaped some privacy reactions but did not remove downstream harms of privacy invasion.
Klöpfer & Rowe, 2026 [25]	Germany; scenario-based survey	German employees	People-analytics capability/information asymmetry	Privacy, trust, usefulness, intention to leave	Privacy risk outweighed usefulness; privacy concerns eroded trust and increased intention to leave.
Mirbabaie et al., 2026 [26]	Digital labour platform; online experiment	N=234 workers	Distributive/informational transparency	Perceived fairness	Transparency did not uniformly improve fairness; distributive transparency had a limited specific effect.
Kimfumu et al., 2026 [31]	UK-linked online employee sample; survey	N=200 employees	15 employee-monitoring software features	Acceptance, trust	Highly invasive features had the lowest trust/acceptance; feature-level trust and system adoption diverged.
Parent-Rochelleau et al., 2026 [27]	Canada (Quebec); time-lagged field study	N=157 unionised workers	Surveillance scope and transparency	Psychological contract, turnover intention	Transparency helped at low/moderate surveillance but did not compensate for extensive surveillance.

Table 3. Methodological appraisal of included studies

Study	Methodological strength	Principal limitation	Appraisal conclusion
Aiello & Kolb, 1995	Experimental manipulation; established outcomes	Laboratory task limits realism	Some concerns (external validity)
Stanton & Barnes-Farrell, 1996	Randomised monitoring conditions; clear constructs	Laboratory setting	No critical limitation
Alge, 2001	Strong causal manipulation of relevance/participation	Temporary-worker setting	No critical limitation
Stanton & Weiss, 2000	Rich qualitative employee accounts	Small self-selected sample	Some concerns
Zweig & Webster, 2003	Large sample; multivariable model	Hypothetical evaluation	Some concerns
McNall & Roch, 2007	Controlled scenario design	Intentions/perceptions rather than behaviour	No critical limitation
Workman, 2009	Field context; organisational outcomes	Observational/common-method risk	Some concerns
Jeske & Santuzzi, 2015	Clear EPM characteristics and measures	Student-worker sample	Some concerns
Abraham et al., 2019	Large factorial experiment; randomised vignette attributes	Hypothetical scenarios	No critical limitation
Wieser & Abraham, 2024	Large factorial design; realistic remote-work trade-offs	Stated preferences	No critical limitation
Vitak & Zimmer, 2023	Large factorial vignette; contextual-integrity framing	US remote-worker context	No critical limitation
Wolff & Niessen, 2024	Powered experiment; manipulation checks	Scenario-based	No critical limitation
Kalischko & Riedl, 2024	Very large field sample; integrated model	Cross-sectional causal limits	Some concerns
Wolff et al., 2024	Multi-method, multi-study replication	Some self-report outcomes	No critical limitation
Klöpfer & Rowe, 2026	Theory-driven scenario model; current PA context	Scenario-based and single-country	No critical limitation
Mirbabaie et al., 2026	Randomised transparency experiment	Platform task context	No critical limitation
Kimfumu et al., 2026	Feature-level analysis; differentiates trust/acceptance	Cross-sectional survey	Some concerns
Parent-Rochelleau et al., 2026	Time-lagged design; real workers	Modest sample; unionised context	No critical limitation

Table 4. Cross-study synthesis of determinants of workforce-analytics acceptance

Determinant	Direction of evidence	Primary mechanism	Downstream outcome	Design implication
Data scope/invasiveness	Consistent negative association	Privacy invasion, reactance	Acceptance/job attractiveness decreases	Restrict collection to necessary, task-relevant categories
Employee participation/voice	Consistent positive association	Procedural justice, perceived control	Greater legitimacy/acceptance	Consult employees before deployment; provide appeal routes
Employee access to data	Generally positive	Ownership, verifiability, control	Greater acceptance/trust	Let employees view and correct data used about them
Purpose (feedback vs policing)	Feedback/development more acceptable	Perceived benefit, reciprocity	Higher acceptance	Separate development analytics from disciplinary use
Transparency	Conditional/mixed	Informational fairness, psychological contract	Helpful at low/moderate surveillance; limited at high scope	Disclose data, logic, retention, recipients and consequences
Organisational trust	Consistent mediator/predictor	Relational security/social exchange	Acceptance increases; turnover decreases	Use governance practices that reduce opportunistic data use
Remote/private-space monitoring	Stronger negative reactions	Boundary violation/contextual integrity	Lower job attractiveness	Use least-intrusive monitoring in home settings
Human/social context	Variable moderator	LMX, norms, culture	Cannot reliably neutralise invasive design	Do not rely on good manager relations to offset poor data governance